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ABSTRACT
As a communicative strategy, hedging plays a central role in academic writing. Numerous 
different linguistic forms can be used to express this strategy. This article attempts to investigate 
modal auxiliary verbs as the principal means of expressing hedging in English academic discourse. 
For this purpose, a corpus of 75 primary empirical research articles from economics, linguistics, 
medicine, natural sciences and engineering was analyzed quantitatively with the help of corpus 
linguistic method. The results revealed that modal auxiliaries were used most frequently in linguistics 
and economics and least frequently in engineering and natural sciences while their use in medicine 
came in between. This seems to suggest that there is noticeable disciplinary variation in the degree 
of hedging through the use of modal auxiliaries in English research articles. Modal auxiliaries tend 
to be more common in soft sciences than in hard sciences whereas their use in health sciences in 
comparison with soft and hard sciences does not seem to show any significant difference.
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INTRODUCTION
Hedges, as originally defined by Lakoff (1973: 
471), are “words whose meaning involves fuzziness—
words whose job is to make things fuzzier or less 
fuzzy”. This concept has been used and subsequently 
extended to such an extent that hedges are now 
commonly viewed, especially in academic discourse, 
as realizations of a communicative startegy called 
‘hedging’ (e.g., Hyland, 1996b, 1998; Markkanen & 
Schrӧder, 1989, 1992, 1997; Myers, 1989; Salager-
Meyer, 1994, 1997, 2011; Skelton, 1988ab). As a 
communicative strategy, hedging seems to have 
been understood differently by different scholars. 
It  is sometimes considered as the expression of 
tentativeness and possibility (e.g., Crismore & Vande 
Kopple, 1988; Hyland, 1996b; Salager-Meyer, 2011). 
For Markkanen & Schrӧder (1989, 1992), hedging 
serves to modify the writer’s responsibility to the 
truth of the propositions expressed, or modify the 
weightiness of the information given or modify the 
writer’s attitude to the information. However, for 
Myers (1989: 12), “[h]edging is a politeness strategy 
when it marks a claim, or any other statement, 
as being provisional, pending acceptance in the 
literature, acceptance by the community—in other 
words, acceptance by the readers”.
In academic writing, hedging plays a crucial 
role (Crismore dan Farnsworth, 1990; Hyland, 
1996b, 1998; Myers, 1989; Salager-Meyer, 1994; 
Swales, 1990). Whereas Crismore dan Farnsworth 
(1990: 135) view hedging as “the mark of a 
professional scientist, one who acknowledges the 
caution with which he or she does science and 
write on science”, Hyland (1996b: 433) considers 
it as “central in academic writing where the need 
to present unproven proposisitons with caution and 
precision is essential”. In addition to indicating 
professionalism, caution and precision, hedging also 
expresses “honesty, modesty and proper caution in 
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self-reports and for diplomatically creating space 
in areas heavily populated by other researchers” 
(Swales, 1990: 175). Probably most importantly 
hedging serves as a marker of knowledge claims. 
Myers (op. cit.: 13) argues that “a sentence that 
looks like a claim but has no hedging is probably 
not a statement of new knowledge”. Likewise, 
Hyland (1998) suggests that hedging can be used as 
a strategy for presenting new knowledge.
As an important communicative strategy, 
hedging can be realized by a large variety of 
linguistic forms. In fact, it can be argued that an 
indefinite number of surface forms can be used 
to express hedging (Brown & Levinson, 1987; 
Markkanen & Schrӧder, 1997). Various attempts 
have been made to categorize these forms (e.g., 
Crompton, 1997; Hyland, 1996a, 1998; Salager-
Meyer, 1994, 1997; Skelton, 1988b). Common to 
all of these categorizations of hedging forms is a 
category of modal auxiliary verbs (modal auxiliaries 
for short). This seems to imply, therefore, that 
modal auxiliaries serve a very important role in 
hedging in English academic discourse. Moreover, 
modal auxiliaries also belong to the concept of 
modality which cuts across the concept of hedging 
(Markkanen & Schrӧder, 1997; Mauranen, 1997). 
Discussions of modality, in English particularly, 
have concentrated mostly on modal auxiliaries (e.g., 
Coates, 1983; 1995; Collins, 2009; Depraetere & 
Reed, 2006; Palmer, 2001). It is therefore the aim 
of this article to investigate hedging through the use 
of modal auxiliaries in English academic writing. 
In particular, it attempts to examine the frequency 
and distribution of modal auxiliaries used to express 
hedging in research articles published in various 
international journals from a number of different 
disciplines. In other words, it seeks to specifically 
answer the following questions: (a) How frequently 
are modal auxiliaries used in English research 
articles across five disciplines? (b) Is there variation 
in the frequency and distribution of the modal 
auxiliaries used as hedges in English research 
articles across the five disciplines?
MODALITY AND MODAL AUXILIARIES IN 
ENGLISH
Modality has attracted so much attention that 
as Perkins (1983: 4) argues, “doing research on 
modality is very similar to trying to move in an 
overcrowded room without treading on anyone 
else’s feet”. It has indeed been studied from the 
points of view of language philosophy (Fine, 2005), 
semantics (mis., Boland, 2006; Coates, 1983; 
Leech, 2004; Lyons, 1977; Palmer, 2001; Perkins, 
1983), and pragmatics (Klinge, 1993; Stubbs, 1986; 
Turnbull & Saxton, 1997). In general, modality, 
according to Lyons (1977: 452), is concerned 
with a speaker’s “opinion or attitude towards the 
proposition that the sentence expresses or the 
situation that the proposition describes”, whereas 
according to Huddleston & Pullum (2002: 173), it 
is concerned with “the speaker’s attitude towards the 
factuality or actualization of the situation expressed 
by the rest of the clause”. An utterance containing 
a modal expression does not represent the situation 
as a fact. Depraetere & Reed suggest that “all modal 
utterances are non-factual, in that they do not assert 
that the situations they describe are facts, and all 
involve the speaker’s comment on the necessity 
or possibility of the truth of the proposition or the 
actualization of a situation.”
As the perspectives from which modality 
is viewed vary, its categorizations also vary. For 
example, Bybee & Fleishman (1985) distinguish 
between agent-oriented modality and epistemic 
modality; Coates (1983) between root modality 
and epistemic modality; Halliday (2014) between 
modulation and modalization; Huddleston 
& Pullum (2002) between deontic modality, 
epistemic modality and dynamic modality; Palmer 
(2001) between propositional modality and event 
modality; Quirk et. al. (1985) between intrinsic 
modality and extrinsic modality; and Van der 
Auwera & Plungian (1998) between epistemic 
modality and non-epistemic modality. Table 
1 shows these classifications of modality as 
summarized by Depraetere & Reed (2006: 280).
However, attention has mostly been paid to 
epistemic modality and deontic or root modality. 
While deontic modality is the modality of obligation 
and is concerned with the speaker’s necessity 
and obligations or readiness towards the action 
or inclination, epistemic modality is concerned 
with “the speaker’s assumptions, or assessment 
of possibilities, and in most cases, it indicates the 
speaker’s confidence or lack of confidence in the 
truth of the proposition expressed” (Coates, 1987: 
112). For Perkins (1983: 10), epistemic modality 
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indicates the speaker’s lack of knowledge about 
the truth of the proposition. For Lyons (1977: 
797), however, an utterance containing epistemic 
modality is an utterance “in which the speaker 
explicitly qualifies his commitment to the truth 
of the proposition expressed by the sentence he 
utters, whether this qualification is made explicit 
in the verbal component (…) or in the prosodic or 
paralinguistic component.” As hedging expresses 
tentativeness, possibility and uncertainty, it is much 
closer to epistemic modality than deontic modality.
Table 1
Classifications of modality (adapted from Depraetere & Reed (2006: 280))
Epistemic modality Rootnecessity
Root
possibility Ability Obligation Permission
Willingness/
permission
epistemic n/a agent-oriented Bybee & Fleishman (1985)
epistemic root modality Coates (1983)
modalization modulation Halliday (2014)
epistemic dynamic deontic dynamic Huddleston & Pullum (2002)
propositional
n/a n/a
event
Palmer  (2001)
evidential epistemic dynamic deontic dynamic
extrinsic intrinsic Quirk et al. (1985)
epistemic
non-epistemic
n/a
Van der 
Auwera
& plungian (1998)
participant-
internal
participant-
external participant-
internal
participant-
external
non-deontic deontic
In English particularly, modality is commonly 
expressed through the use of modal auxiliaries. 
These auxiliaries are generally used to express 
“degree of certainty” and “degree of obligation” 
(Carter & McCarthy, 2006: 898). Coates (1983) 
has discussed in detail the range of meanings that 
such modal auxiliaries can convey, as summarized 
in Table 2 below.
Table 2
Summary of the meanings of modal auxiliaries  
(Coates, 1983)
Modals
Auxiliaries Meanings
can ability, root possibility, permission
could root possibility, epistemic possibility, ability, 
hypothesis
may root possibility, epistemic possibility, 
permission
might root possibility, epistemic possibility, 
permission, hypothesis
must strong obligation, confident inference
shall strong obligation, volition, prediction, 
determination
should weak obligation, tentative inference, 
hypothesis, necessity
will volition, prediction, predictability
would prediction, hypothesis, volition
Modal auxiliaries belong to the larger class 
of auxiliaries, including primary auxiliary verbs 
be, do and have (Quirk et. al., 1972: 69). Like all 
auxiliary verbs, the modal auxiliaries syntactically 
differ from lexical verbs in their capacity to be 
used in what Huddleston & Pullum (2002: 93) call 
NICE constructions (Negation, Inversion, Code 
and Emphasis). In addition, the modal auxiliaries 
have other properties which are distinctive to them: 
(a) they only have tensed forms; (b) they do not 
show any agreement with the subject; (c) they take 
bare infinitival complements; (d) they are used as 
the first verb in an unreal conditional construction; 
and (e) there is much less restriction in the use of 
their preterites with the modal remoteness meaning 
than with other verbs. (For further information, 
see Huddleston & Pullum (2002: 106-107)). 
These properties differentiate between what Quirk 
et.al. (1985: 137) call central modals (can, could, 
may, might, shall, should, will, would, must) and 
marginal modals (dare, need, ought to, used to). 
Modal auxiliriaries, especially central modals, 
constitute the principal means of expressing 
epistemic modality. Therefore, this study focuses 
on the central modal auxiliaries used as realizations 
of hedging in English academic discourse.
40
Humaniora, Vol. 28, No. 1 Februari 2016
MATERIALS AND METHODS
This study is corpus-based in that corpus data 
are used not only for illustrative purposes only but 
also as a source of quantitative information. This 
computer-assisted study with a sizeable corpus 
hinges on the principle that “the more material the 
analysis is based on, the safer the conclusions drawn 
will be, and the more generalisable the results will 
be” (Ädel, 2006: 8). Moreover, as Hyland (1998: 
94) argues, “an analysis of a representative corpus 
can identify the most common features of the 
linguistic system we use, frequency being seen as 
one measure of significance.”
To achieve the goal of the study as mentioned 
above, a corpus was generated, consisting of 75 
primary, empirical research articles (RAs), 15 
articles each from the fields of economics (106,800 
words), linguistics (120,509 words), medicine 
(57,814 words), natural sciences (75,078 words) 
and engineering (83,541 words), thus amounting 
to a total of 443,742 running words, excluding 
the abstracts, formulas, equations, table titles, 
references and endnotes or footnotes. The five 
fields of study represent soft sciences (economics 
and linguistics), hard sciences (natural sciences 
and engineering) and health sciences (medicine). 
This was done so as to detect whether there is 
variation in the use of modal auxiliaries to express 
hedging in the three clusters of sciences. The 75 
articles were published in various international 
journals in the period between 2009-2011. All 
the selected journals were listed in Thompson 
Reuter’s 2009 Arts and Humanities Citation Index, 
Science Citation Index Expanded or Social Science 
Citation Index.
As mentioned previously, various types of 
linguistic forms can be used to express hedging. 
This study focuses only on one type, i.e., the central 
modal auxiliaries can, could, may, might, shall, 
should, will, would and must. Data containing these 
modal auxiliaries were retrieved using WordSmith 
Tools 5 (Scott, 2008). However, it should be borne 
in mind that as these modals can be used to express 
hedging as well as other meanings, all the collected 
data had to go through a process called ‘sifting’, 
i.e., “choosing search terms that will yield a large 
number of hits, and then manually discarding the 
irrelevant ones” (Ädel, 2006: 47). Thus, in this 
study, only sentences containing modal auxiliaries 
used to express tentativeness, possibility, doubt 
and uncertainty were included as the data for 
analysis. To investigate variation in the use of 
modal auxiliriaries in the research articles, the 
data were analyzed in terms of the frequency and 
distribution of the modals in the five disciplines. 
For ease of reference and for illustrative purposes, 
all sentences containing modal auxiliaries used 
as hedging devices were coded with the letters 
E, L, M, N, G as a shorthand respectively for 
economics, linguistics, medicine, natural sciences 
and engineering, followed by a number and the 
letters I, M, R, D for Introduction, Methods, 
Results and Discussion, representing rhetorical 
sections of the research article. Thus, a sentence 
given the code E01D, for example, indicates that it 
was taken from the Discussion section of the first 
article in economics.
As the lengths of the articles in each of 
the five disciplines vary, the counting of modal 
auxiliaries used in the articles in each discipline 
was conducted, not on the basis of raw occurrences, 
but on the basis of normalized occurrences of the 
modals used to express hedging. Normalization 
here refers to “a way to convert raw counts into 
rates of occurrence, so that the scores from texts of 
different lengths can be compared” (Biber & Jones, 
2009: 1299). In this study, all the modal auxiliaries 
used as hedging in the corpus were normalized as 
per 10,000 words using the following formula:
              Frequency (Raw count) * 10,000
Normalized frequency =  
         Number of words
For instance, if 100 instances of may were 
used as hedges in the 15 research articles in 
economics, which contains 106,800 words, then 
its normalized or relative frequency is 100 times 
10,000 divided by 106,800 which is equal to 9.7. 
Following Pho (2013), the constant 10,000, not 
1,000 as used, for example, by Hyland (1998) and 
Varttala (2001), was selected to avoid expected 
frequencies of less than 5, which would make the 
chi-square test unreliable. McEnery & Wilson 
(2001: 83-84) suggest that whichever option is 
selected is not crucial as long as it is indicated 
which option is used.
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Almost all of the nine central modal auxiliaries 
were found to be used to express hedging in the 
corpus. However, no instance of shall was found 
as a hedging device. Table 3 shows the overall 
frequency and distribution of the eight modal 
auxiliaries used to express hedging in the corpus.
As can be seen in the table, the modal 
auxiliaries are most frequently used in linguistics 
(38.9 per 10,000 words) and economics (38.6) 
and least frequently in engineering (21.7) and 
natural sciences (21.0), while their use in medicine 
(29.9) comes in between. Statistical analysis using 
Minitab Release 17 software by means of the chi-
square test with a significant level, or p-value, 
set at 0.05, which is common for social studies, 
including linguistics (Gomez, 2004: 244; Sanjaya, 
2013: 95), reveals that the distribution of the modal 
auxiliaries differ somewhat significantly in the five 
disciplines under investigation (χ2(4) = 10.1589, 
p = 0.038). This seems to suggest that modal 
auxiliaries tend to be more frequently used in soft 
sciences than in hard sciences, whereas the use of 
these modals in health sciences in comparison with 
soft and hard sciences does not seem to show any 
significant difference. This finding also seems to be 
consistent with that of Varttala (2001) where modal 
auxiliaries are used most frequently in economics 
(51.8) and least frequently in engineering (19.5) 
whereas in medicine the use of this modal is in 
between (34.2). 
Table 3
Frequency and distribution of modal auxiliaries across 
five disciplines (per 10,000 words)
Modal  
auxiliaries
Econo- 
mics
Linguis- 
tics
Medi- 
cine
Natural 
Sciences
Engineer-
ing Mean
may 16.0 15.8 9.3 7.7 10.9 11.9
would 5.9 8.5 5.5 4.7 4.1 5.7
will 10.8 5.9 2.1 2.8 2.4 4.8
might 2.1 2.6 6.4 1.5 0.5 2.6
could 1.5 1.7 4.7 2.8 1.8 2.5
should 1.9 3.4 1.6 0.3 1.3 1.7
can 0.3 1.0 0.3 1.1 0.5 0.6
must 0.2 0.1 - 0.3 0.2 0.2
Total 38.6 38.9 29.9 21.0 21.7 30.0
The table also shows some individual 
differences in the use of modal auxiliaries as 
hedges. As can be seen, the most frequently used 
modal auxiliary was may and the least was must 
across the five disciplines. It is interesting to note 
that the second most frequently used modal differed 
across the disciplines. While would was the second 
most frequently used modal in linguistics, natural 
sciences and engineering, it was the third most 
frequently used modal after will in economics and 
after might in medicine.  It is also interesting to note 
that some noticeable differences were observed 
between the results of the present study and those 
from previous studies, particularly those of Hyland 
(1998) and Varttala (2001). One obvious difference 
was the use of would where in Hyland’s corpus it 
was ranked first as the most frequently used modal 
while in the present corpus it was ranked second 
and in Varttala it was ranked fifth. However, while 
in both this study and Varttala’s may was found to 
be the most common hedge, it was ranked second 
in Hyland’s. It can also be observed that will was 
very frequently used as hedges in this corpus but 
it was not both in Hyland’s and Varttala’s corpora. 
Furthermore, could was more commonly used in 
both Hyland’s and Varttala’s than in this corpus. 
The same is true for might. Interestingly, the use of 
should was found to be similar in the three corpora. 
In short, the distributions of modal auxiliaries 
in the three corpora differ significantly (χ2(12) = 
180.793, p < 0.001). In other words, the three 
corpora show significantly different patterns of use 
of modal auxiliaries as hedging devices.
What reasons underlie these disciplinary 
differences in the use of modal auxiliaries as 
hedges? A number of scholars have made some 
suggestions regarding such differences (see, e.g., 
Bondi, 2006; Hyland, 1999, 2008; Malavasi & 
Mazzi, 2008; Taylor & Chen, 1991). Taylor & 
Chen (1991), for example, suggest that disciplinary 
cultures play an important role in shaping 
disciplinary discourses. But according to Hyland 
(1999), rhetorical constraints within a discipline 
affect disciplinary differences, whereas Bondi 
(2006) speculates that the main reason behind 
such differences lies in the language used (see 
also Malavasi & Mazzi, 2008). Similarly, Hyland 
(2008) also believes that discipline specificity lies 
in language. Furthermore, he argues that different 
disciplines value different kinds of arguments 
and also vary in what their readers already know 
and how they might be persuaded. Consequently, 
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Hyland believes that philosophers do not write like 
linguists or physicists. He suggests that disciplines 
make up a continuum with hard sciences like 
natural sciences and enginerring at one end and 
soft sciences  such as economics and linguistics 
at the other. While hard sciences are regarded 
as objective, empirical, quantitative, utilizing 
experimental methods, putting greater emphasis 
on methods, procedures and equipment, showing 
linear and cumulative growth, and not relying on 
rhetoric, soft sciences are treated as interpretive 
and qualitative, using discursive argument and 
more fluid discourses, and putting greater weight 
on the strength of argument to present knowledge 
claims. Hyland (2008) claims that hard sciences 
tend to use more modals such as could and may in 
order to objectify their research.
As shown above, the results seem to support 
Hyland’s (2008) contention above that authors 
from different discipline write differently. It was 
found that in terms of the use of modal auxiliries 
as hedging devices, authors from economics, for 
example, do not seem to write like those from 
engineering or from medicine. The five disciplines 
do seem to range along a cline with engineering 
and natural sciences at one end and linguistics 
and economics at the other whereas medicine lies 
in between. However, it is important to note that 
while engineering and natural sciences, and to a 
large extend also medicine, tended to put more 
emphasis on methods, procedures and equipment, 
and rely less on rhetoric, linguistics and economics 
were also found to be objective, empirical and 
quantitative, putting a lot of weight on methods and 
procedures. Moreover, the results of the present 
research do not seem to support Hyland’s (2008) 
claim that authors from hard sciences use more 
modals such as may and would to objectify their 
research. On the contrary, the results show that soft 
sciences like linguistics and economics make more 
use of modal auxiliaries, suggesting that they seem 
to be more tentative and cautious in presenting new 
knowledge claims.
In what follows, I will look more closely into 
how the modal auxiliaries were used as hedges in 
the data, beginning with the most commonly used 
modals.
May/Might
The modal auxiliaries may and also its 
preterite form might have often been considered as 
the prototypical hedging devices (Hyland, 1998: 
116). This is evident from the relatively high 
frequency of use of these modals found in this 
study and in Hyland (1998) and Varttala (2001) 
as well as in those reported in Hyland (op. cit.: 
107). May can be used to express epistemic  and 
non-epistemic modality. Its epistemic meaning can 
be readily differentiated from their non-epistemic 
meaning through paraphrase, i.e., as it is possible 
that or it may be that for its epistemic meaning and 
as it is possible for for its non-epistemic meaning. 
While epistemic may can co-occur with the adverbs 
possibly and well, which “imply probability where 
the auxiliary alone connoted only possibility” 
(Quirk et. al., 1985: 588), non-epistemic may 
cannot. Epistemic may can also co-occur with the 
perfect aspect, but this is rare with non-epistemic 
may (Butler, 1990: 147).
In most cases (78.6%) may in this study was 
found to be used to express epistemic meaning, 
and as Table 3 above shows, it was found to be the 
most commonly used modal  auxiliary across the 
five disciplines. The predominant use of may is to 
be expected as previous studies have shown that 
may is most typically used as a token of epistemic 
meaning (Coates, 1983; Collins, 2009). Collins 
(ibid.: 92) found in the three corpora he examined, 
i.e., the British component of the International 
Corpus of English (‘ICE-GB’), the Australian 
component of the International Corpus of English 
(‘ICE-AUS’), and a specially assembled corpus of 
American English (‘C-US’), that 79% of may was 
used with epistemic meaning and only 15.1% with 
non-epistemic meaning, while the remaining with 
inderteminate meaning which Coates (1983: 145) 
calls a “merger” between epistemic and deontic 
modality. Below are some examples of may used 
as a hedging device in the data. In these examples, 
may indicates the RA writers’ lack of confidence 
in the truth of the propositions expressed in each 
of the sentences. In cases like these, as Huddleston 
& Pullum (2002: 182) argue, “[epistemic] may 
triggers a strong implicature that I don’t know 
that the proposition is true. If I knew that it was 
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true, I would normally be expected to use the 
unmodalised form—He’s ill, say, rather than the 
much weaker He may be ill”.
(1) The importance of association rights for 
the German data may reflect cultural 
differences in the quality and quantity of 
friendship relations. (L01D)
(2) It may well be the case that there are 
differences in other coefficients, for 
instance different returns to experience 
and education, both acquired in the 
country of origin and the destination 
country.11 (E13R)
(3) The observed anomalous behaviors of 
the formulations during residual curing 
may be possibly due to the additional 
reactions between the propagating cation 
and these functional groups. (G15R)
Similarly, might was more commonly used 
with epistemic meaning (63.6%) than with non-
epistemic meaning (36.4%). This is slightly lower 
than that reported in Collins (2009: 109) where 
epistemic may accounted for 77.2% of tokens, 
and much lower than that in Brewer (1987) where 
it amounted to 81.4%. The two examples below 
illustrate the use of might as a hedging device. 
Might here expresses epistemic possibility and 
tentativeness.
(4) Future work might fruitfully examine 
exactly how neighborhood demographics 
and preservation policy affect one 
another. (E10D)
(5) The same reasoning might explain 
the structural basis for promiscuous 
proteins, which recognize multiple 
partners with essentially the same set of 
interfacial residues. (N14D)
It should be noted, however, that in present-
day English, as Coates (1983: 157) argues, might 
is very rarely used as a past-time equivalent of 
may (cf. Perkins, 1983: 54; Huddleston & Pullum, 
2002: 203). It has been suggested (e.g., Hermerén, 
1978; Palmer, 1990; Perkins, 1983) that in terms 
of likelihood, might indicates a lower degree than 
may. In addition, might also expresses a higher 
degree of tentativeness: the truth of the proposition 
expressed in the sentence where might is used is 
more tentative than may. However, Coates (1983) 
reports that may and might were found to express 
similar degrees of likelihood in her data. Coates 
(ibid. : 152) contends that “MIGHT, in my data 
at least, does not seem to express a more tentative 
meaning than MAY” (original emphasis). Collins 
(2009: 111) supports this claim, reporting that in 
his data numerous cases of epistemic may and 
might were used alternately without any apparent 
difference in tentativeness.
As far as both modal auxiliaries are used 
as hedging devices, these differing viewpoints 
are in fact not really significant (Varttala, 2001). 
However, they can be very important in terms of 
the effects that both may have on the reader. This 
is true particularly in scientific communication 
where a scientist’s success and reputation often 
depend on considerations of degrees of confidence 
in the information that s/he presents. Therefore, 
as Varttala (ibid.: 107) argues, “although may and 
might are perhaps at times used interchangeably, 
their potential meaning distinction should merit 
at least some thought for example in pedagogical 
materials relating to scientific communication.”
WILL/WOULD
Like may and  might,  will  and its past 
tense form would can also be used to express 
epistemic and non-epistemic modality. Will is more 
commonly used to express epistemic meaning 
than non-epitemic meaning. Brewer (1987: 220), 
for instance, reports that will was mostly (95%) 
used to express epistemic meaning in political 
discourse in the U.K. Besides, Collins (2009: 126) 
also found that this modal auxiliary was mostly 
used with epistemic meaning (59.2%), 30.4% with 
dynamic meaning, 1.7% with deontic meaning and 
the remaining 5.2% with inderteminate meaning. 
In this study will was mostly found as a hedging 
device expressing epistemic meaning (64.9%). 
As a hedging device, however, on average, will 
was found to be slightly lower than would. The 
examples below illustrate the use of will as a 
hedging device with epistemic meaning.
(6) As many of the variables used in this 
analysis would presumably also be 
significant in a hedonic price equation, 
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they will likely not serve as valid 
instruments for policy choice. (E10D)
(7) If the focus is on the risk estimate and its 
associated confidence interval, a patient 
who starts treatment will be eligible to 
drive after being seizure-free for six 
months. (M07D)
(8) The computed seismic modulus will vary 
by frequency according to the master 
curve in undamaged, homogeneous 
asphalt concrete. (G08M)
As an expression of epistemic modality, will 
can be used to indicate prediction (Coates, 1983: 
169) or futurity (Huddleston & Pullum, 2002: 
188) as shown in (6) above. Coates (op. cit.: 184) 
argues that in academic writing the use of will 
indicating prediction implies a lower degree of 
the writers’ commitment to the factuality of what 
they say. Moreover, she observes that in science an 
utterance expressing prediction is not the same in 
terms of tentativeness as an utterance presenting 
results deduced from clear evidence. In addition, as 
prediction is closely related to futurity, Huddleston 
& Pullum (2002: 190) suggest that “our knowledge 
about the future is inevitably much more limited 
than our knowledge about the past and the present, 
and what we say about the future will typically be 
perceived as having the character of a prediction 
rather than an unqualified factual assertion.” 
Therefore, such use of will was treated as a hedge 
in this study. This is probably partly the reason why 
will was used much more frequently in this study 
than in those of Hyland (1998) and Varttala (2001).
In addition to prediction, will also indicates 
predictability (Coates, 1983: 169) as illustrated 
in (7) above. This is what Huddleston & Pullum 
(2002: 188) call ‘”central-epistemic” use of will. 
This will can convey a higher degree of the RA 
writers’ confidence in the truth of the proposition 
based on evidence and knowledge of a present or 
past situation and it is very common in science, 
especially as expressed in the form of conditionals 
(Leech, 2004: §126). Semantically, predictability 
will is comparable in strength to epistemic must. As 
Huddleston & Pullum (op. cit.: 189) argue, “[m]ust 
conveys the idea of conclusion, and is often used in 
explanations (…). With central-epistemic will it is 
more a matter of assumption or expectation, very 
often with suggestion of future confirmation (…).”
Turning now to would, like will, it is more 
commonly used as an expression of epistemic 
modality than deontic or dynamic modality. In this 
study, would was more frequently used to express 
epistemic modality (69.1%) than non-epistemic 
modality (30.9%). This is consistent with Collins’ 
(2009: 140) findings in which the modal auxiliary 
was more frequently used with epistemic meaning 
(64.3%) than with dynamic meaning (22.9%) (see 
also Brewer, 1987: 233). Below are some examples 
illustrating the use of would as a hedge.
(9) Our main hypothesis was that differences 
would emerge in the kind of offenses 
reported by the five different groups, and 
indeed they did. (L01D)
(10) Most importantly, if the silane layer was 
damaged or oxidized during the long 
deposition time, the highly polar C1s 
peaks, indicating CO or CN, would be 
quite large. (N01R
(11) We argue that  invest igat ing the 
interaction between OI narrative and 
legitimacy when organizations respond 
to environmental changes would provide 
a significant contribution. (E05R)
(12) It would seem that physicians were 
responding judiciously in integrating the 
published evidence into their practices. 
(M02D)
Coates (1983), Leech (2004) and Perkins 
(1983) all suggest that would, like could, might 
and should, is commonly used as a grammatical 
expression of hypotheticality as exemplified in 
(9). According to Coates (1983: 205ff), would is 
used as the main hypothetical modal auxiliary 
with epistemic meaning and in scientific writing it 
is commonly used as the hypothetical alternative 
of will expressing prediction and predictability. 
As an expression of hypotheticality, would is often 
found in the apodosis, or main clause, of an unreal 
conditional (10). However, as example (11) shows, 
sometimes the protasis, or subordinate clause, is 
not explicitly expressed. This is what Leech (2004: 
§185) calls ‘pure hypothesis’. Leech (ibid.) argues 
that this use of hypothetical would is a common 
feature of written English, especially academic 
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writing. It can be used by the writers as an evasive 
or defensive strategy and to distance their claim 
from reality. If used together with such verbs as 
appear, seem, suggest and tend, as illustrated in 
(12), such hypothetical would indicates a higher 
degree of tentativeness.
Can/Could
Unlike the previous modal auxiliaries, can is 
most commonly used to express dynamic modality. 
Collins (2009: 98) reports that 81% of can was 
used with dynamic meaning, 9.9% with deontic 
meaning, 1.1% with epistemic meaning and the 
rest with inderteminate meaning. Brewer (1987: 
257, 291) did not find even a single use of can 
with epistemic meaning. In his data, this modal 
was mostly used to convey dynamic meaning 
(95.5%) and the remaining 4.5% deontic meaning. 
Likewise, in this study, it was mostly used with 
non-epistemic meaning (97.5%) and only 2.5% 
with epistemic meaning.
It should be noted that as an expression of 
epistemic modality, can has attracted differing 
opinions. For some scholars (e.g., Butler, 1990; 
Coates, 1983; Leech, 2004), can is not directly 
linked to epistemic modality. Coates (1983), for 
instance, treats can only as a suppletive form for 
must, providing the missing non-affirmative form 
in the epistemic must paradigm. For other scholars 
(e.g., Butler, 1990; Collins, 2009; Huddleston 
& Pullum, 2002; Hyland, 1998), can may serve 
as a marker of epistemic possibility only in 
interrogative or negative constructions. In this 
study, as a hedging device, can was mostly 
used in negative constructions and only a small 
proportion in interrogatives. Used in a negative 
construction, can indicates the non-existence 
of epistemic possibility (it is not possible that), 
while in an interrogative construction, it is used 
to question epistemic possibility. The examples 
below illustrate the use of can as a hedge in both 
negative and interrogative contexts.
(13) Thus, it cannot be the case that any 
analysis will reveal entirely distinct 
repertoires, particularly when the 
resource are shared (…). (L07D)
(14) How can the N-peptide regulate fusion 
with such spatial flexibility?
Like can, could can be used to convey 
deontic, dynamic or epistemic meaning. In this 
study, it was used more commonly as an expression 
of non-epistemic than epistemic modality with a 
ratio of 85.5% to 14.5%. This ratio is similar to 
that reported by Collins (2009: 109), i.e., 85.9% 
to 14.1% and Brewer (1987: 219), i.e., 94.2% to 
5.8%. This modal was also rarely used as a marker 
of epistemic meaning in Butler’s (1990) and 
Coates’ (1983) data.
While can indicates epistemic possibility 
only in negative and interrogative environments, 
could, like may and might, can be used to express 
tentative possiblity in an affirmative context as 
illustrated in (15) below. Occasionally it is used 
in harmonic combinations (Halliday, 1970: 331; 
Lyons, 1977: 807) with other modal auxiliaries, 
especially may, might and would. As exemplified in 
(16) below, the use of could in such combinations 
implies that the RA writers attempt to be cautious 
with their tentative claims. Furthermore, could 
can also be used together with modal lexical 
verbs (e.g., appear, believe, indicate, speculate, 
suggest), modal adjectives (e.g., likely, possible), 
modal adverbs (e.g., perhaps, well), and modal 
nouns (e.g., conclusion, possibility, suggestion). 
Examples 17-20 below illustrate the use of could 
in such combinations.
(15) It is possible that the effect of the press 
could be different in less predictable 
contexts, such as a merger announcement 
or a change in management. (E07D)
(16) Embarassment about seeking services 
could also be related to traditional 
barriers such as stigma, but it might also 
be associated with cultural barriers such 
as fear of loss of face.41,43,70 (M05D)
(17) This could suggest that interactions are 
only transient and may be restricted 
to appressoria (i.e., a stage not yet 
accessible to biochemical analysis). 
(N10D)
(18) It is unlikely that this has biased analyses, 
however, as patients with a recurrence 
within six months of their first seizure 
could not contribute to the risk estimates 
presented in this paper (…). (M07D)
(19) Weighed against this, however, some 
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respondents may recall the previous 
community-based health insurance 
study and believe that the re-organization 
could well occur (…). (E06D)
(20) This  i s  cons is tent  wi th  Polka’s 
suggestion (1991, 1992) that a high 
degree of phonetic similarity between 
two non-native segments could increase 
perceptual difficulty for the listener. 
(L12D)
Should and Must
Should is commonly used to convey non-
epistemic (i.e., deontic) meaning and only 
occasionally epistemic meaning. In this study, 
it was mostly used with non-epistemic meaning 
(81.3%) and only 18.7% with epistemic meaning. 
This is not much different from Brewer’s (1987) 
and Collins’ (2009) findings. Brewer (1987: 244) 
reports that should was much more commonly used 
with deontic meaning (84%) and the remaining 
16% with epistemic meaning. Likewise, Collins 
(ibid.: 45) found that non-epistemic should was 
more frequently used (88.2%) than epistemic 
should (11.8%).
As an expression of epistemic modality, 
should indicates a somewhat extreme possibility, 
or a reasonable assumption or conclusion; it is 
therefore possible that the speaker is mistaken 
(Palmer, 1990: 59). Consequently, such use of 
should can be treated as a hedging device because 
it expresses “a tentative assumption, assessment of 
probability, based on facts known to the speaker” 
(Coates, 1983: 64). Example (21) below illustrates 
this use of should. The tentativity of should can also 
be detected from its use together with such modal 
auxiliaries as may, could and would (22) or with 
such modal lexical verbs as argue, assume, predict, 
suggest and tend (23). Besides, as exemplified 
in (24), should can also be used in conditional 
constructions in which it “expresses slightly 
greater doubt than the non-modal counterpart” 
(Huddleston & Pullum, 2002: 188).
(21) Given these findings,  cul tural ly 
relevant services and outreach to these 
communities should be mindful of 
generational differences. (M05D)
(22) As a result, the solutions may not be truly 
optimal, but should provide a reasonable 
estimate of the actual variation in layer 
thickness and modulus. (G08M)
(23) Assuming that their commitment to 
the project also serves as a catalyst 
of its commercial success and artistic 
recognit ion,  i ts  scale should  be 
proportional to the potential that they 
detect in it early on. (E11I)
(24) If they derive from distinct configurations 
of the resources available for the 
construction of dialogue, then it should 
be possible to isolate some evidence 
of longitudinal differentiation between 
Maori and Pakeha speakers (L07D)
Like should, must is also more commonly used 
to convey non-epistemic modality than epistemic 
modality. Collins (2009: 34) reports that 57.3% 
of must was used to convey deontic meaning, 
32.8% epistemic meaning, 6.3% dynamic meaning 
and the remaining 3.6% indeterminate meaning. 
Similarly, Brewer (1987: 261) found that over 
70% of must was used as an expression of deontic 
modality and the remaining as an expression of 
epistemic modality but with a deontic element in 
their meaning. In this study, non-epistemic must is 
much more common (90.9%) than epistemic must 
(9.1%). The rare occurences of epistemic must 
in academic writing have also been observed by 
Butler (1990) and Hyland (1998). This, Hyland 
(ibid.: 109) argues, “may suggest writers are 
reluctant to express even weak convictions 
concerning the truth of their propositions.” As an 
expression of epistemic meaning, must is closely 
related to “confident inference” (Coates, 1983: 
31). Must differs from should, according to Butler 
(1990: 162), in that it “expresses a higher degree of 
obligation, or a greater confidence in a conclusion 
from the evidence.” The two examples below 
illustrate the use of epistemic must as a hedging 
device.
(25) In a sample of private debt Frankel and 
Litov do not find systematic evidence 
to support this hypothesis and conclude 
that any relation between covenants and 
conservatism must be marginal. (E09D)
(26) For the husk bridge to collapse, the 
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narrower width of the bed must be 
sufficiently long to produce a bending 
stress that exceeds its allowable stress. 
(N08R)
CONCLUSION
The foregoing discussion has shown that 
there seems to be significant disciplinary variation 
in the use of modal auxiliaries as hedging devices 
in English research articles. As hedges, modal 
auxiliaries tend to be more common in soft 
sciences (linguistics and economics) than in 
hard sciences (engineering and natural sciences) 
whereas their use in health sciences (medicine) 
does not seem to show any significant difference 
as compared with soft and hard sciences. While the 
use of modal auxiliaries in medicine as well as in 
engineering supports Varttala’s (2001) findings, the 
use of these modals in economics is much lower 
than that in Varttala. In addition, their use in natural 
sciences is also much lower than that in Hyland 
(1998). This disciplinary variation seems to have 
been caused mostly by different research traditions 
with linguistics and economics tending to be more 
discursive and interpretive, more tentative and 
more cautious in presenting knowledge claims than 
engineering, natural sciences and even medicine.
The study has also revealed that there seems 
to be significant disciplinary variation in the use 
of individual modals. While may is the one modal 
most commonly used in the five disciplines under 
investigation, would and will are the second most 
commonly used modals in linguistics, natural 
sciences and engineering. However, in economics 
would is third and will second. In medicine, the 
second and third most frequently used modals are 
might and would. This suggests a slightly different 
pattern of use of modal auxiliaries in each of the 
disciplines. In general, this study is consistent with 
Hyland (1998) and Varttala (2001), except for 
the use of will, which was found to be a common 
hedging device in this study, but rarely used in both 
Hyland and Varttala.
As the principal means of expressing hedging 
in English academic discourse, modal auxiliaries 
express tentativeness and possibility. They are 
therefore central to academic writing in which it 
is essential to present unproven propositions with 
caution and precision. They play a central role in the 
negotiation of claims for new knowledge and “in 
gaining ratification for claims for a powerful peer 
group by allowing writers to present statements 
with appropriate accuracy, caution, and humility, 
expressing possibility rather than certainty and 
prudence rather than overconfidence” (Salager-
Meyer, 2011: 35-6). Yet, as they have many 
different and subtle meanings, modal auxiliaries 
are notoriously difficult for first or second language 
learners, let alone foreign language learners, to 
master (cf. Holmes, 1988: 21-2). Discussing the 
difficulties French and Dutch students face in 
learning to express appropriately modal meaning in 
English, Robberecht & Peteghem (1982: 35-6, cited 
in Holmes, 1988: 22) observe that these students 
do not seem to have “feeling for” the nuances of 
modal verbs and do not use them as frequently as 
native speakers do. A similar observation was made 
by Kasper (1979: 276) about German learners of 
English, who generally show a “low awareness 
of modality as a pragmatic category” and also a 
low awareness of “the linguistic means whereby 
modality is realized.” Furthermore, Ventola (1990) 
also observes that the mastery of modal auxiliaries 
expressing probability present Finnish writers with 
a challenge. She consequently concludes that such 
modal auxiliaries “should be one of the focal points 
of any course to improve the academic writing 
skills of nonnative speakers” (ibid.: 176). On the 
same note, considering all these difficulties that 
nonnative writers face in the use modal auxiliaries 
in English, it is suggested that in order for 
Indonesian scholars attempting to win the heart of 
international audience (Adnan & Zifirdaus, 2005) 
through international publication in English, they 
have to equip themselves with ways of expressing 
degrees of possibility and tentativeness through 
the use of, among others, modal auxiliaries. This is 
important as such hedging devices can be used, as 
mentioned previously, to negotiate their knowledge 
claims and in turn to increase the opportunity 
for their claims to be ratified by their discourse 
community; thus increasing their visibility as 
credible scientists internationally.
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